Modi's Foriegn Policy - Indian Expansionism’s Big Power Dreams - A paper by Ajith, now deteined in indian prison. 1-28 july international campaign from ICSPWI

An excerpt from the statement of the International Committee in support of the people’s war In India, Afghanistan

.... Comrade Ajith’s crime is to dedicate more than four decades of his life to the relentless struggle against a brutal and reactionary system which is exploiting, oppressing, grinding, and sucking the blood of hundreds of millions of the wretched of the earth. …

....Comrade Ajith’s crime has been to think and imagine and fight for a better world, in which all these atrocities become history. But for the reactionary Indian state, which shamelessly claims to be the “biggest democracy” in the world this is a crime. …

Comrade Ajith is an ideologue of the CPI (Maoist), which is currently leading a revolutionary people’s war to demolish the system of semi-feudal, capitalist and imperialist oppression and exploitation and to establish new democracy and socialism. Comrade has dedicated more than four decades of his life for this cause.

The following paper by comrade Ajith was published on the Vol. 3 No3 of People’s March, January-March 2015 - 1st part

Modi's Foriegn Policy

Indian Expansionism’s Big Power Dreams

By ajith

Nearly a year into its rule, the Modi regime is yet to deliver anything substantial on the socalled ‘economic growth’ front –– other than several policy decisions that further open up the country to imperialist plunder. Despite the windfall gain made through the steep fall in crude oil prices, the Central government’s finances are still in a bad shape. With their hype on fasttracking the economy punctured, Modi’s spindoctors are now trumpeting his foreign policy. The claim is that he has masterfully catapulted India into a prominent position on the world arena through his international moves. Obama's visit as the chief guest at the Republic Day parade took this to a frenzy. Forceful, dynamic, strategic –– the flow of adjectives are torrential. On closer observation, they stand in inverse proportion to actual results.

Modi has indeed taken India into an even closer engagement with the US and its allies Japan and Australia, both of whom are pivotal in the US strategic plan to contain China. Closer ties with Vietnam and Fiji are promoted as a counterplay to China’s penetration in South Asia. But where it really matters for Indian expansionism, in South Asia, it is steadily being pressed by the growing weight of China. Though the Indian rulers once again succeeded in blocking China’s entry, it couldn’t prevent this issue from becoming a major topic in the November 2014 SAARC summit. Moreover, support for China’s membership has gained more adherents. Other than Pakistan, now Sri Lanka and the Maldives argued for it, with Nepal tacitly acceding. China holds out the promise of huge investments, which means fat commissions and they see no reason to forsake it. This was ultimately reflected in the wording of the declaration issued by the SAARC summit of November 2014 which instructed its concerned body to “…to engage the SAARC Observers into productive, demanddriven and objective project based cooperation in priority areas as identified by the Member States.” India’s opposition is increasingly getting isolated as petty obstructionism. Meanwhile, Indian expansionist plans for its greater and quicker economic penetration of South Asia through a Trade Pact continued to be blocked by Pakistan. Several other developments also underline the limits of Modi’s initiatives in South Asia. Maldives has for some time now been moving closer to China. The cancellation of a major airport project given to an Indian firm and its replacement by a Chinese infrastructure concern was a landmark of sorts in this trend. It has now been further strengthened by the Maldivian government’s decision to endorse the 21st century Maritime Silk Route (MSR) promoted by Chinese expansionism. The MSR visualises development of a sea route from China’s Fujian province to the Mediterranean Sea via South Asia and East Africa. It complements the land based Silk Route proposed through Central Asia, linking China to Europe. The Maldivian endorsement of the MSR involves the building of a deep sea port on its northernmost Atoll, which will eventually open up space for Chinese naval activity. Ironically, the Maldivian President Abdulla Yammeen too has announced a ‘look East’ shift in foreign policy, a shift to closer ties with China. His reasoning was that economic cooperation with China does not challenge Maldives’ “Islamic” identity unlike ties with “Western colonial powers”. It is obvious that the real entity he had in mind was India, which had tried to prop up a new power centre in the form of the presidency of Mohamed Nashed, not part of the traditional ruling elite. The Brahmanic Hindutva Sangh Parivar banners of the Modi regime are certainly not going to ease the path of Indian expansionism over there.

If Maldives is a new headache for the Indian rulers, Sri Lanka under its former President Mahinda Rajapaksa had become increasingly explicit in servicing of Chinese expansionist interests. The repeated port calls of Chinese submarines in Sri Lanka ignoring Delhi’s opposition was big news in the Indian media, accompanied by reports of how the Modi government made its ‘strong displeasure’ known to Rajapaksa. But there was nothing to show that this mattered to Colombo. The Modi regime will surely be hoping that the new presidency of Maithripala Sirisena will be of help in once again securing its domination. Reports, which are now coming out in the media, indicate that his defection from the Rajapaksa camp and success in stitching up a winning alliance was no sudden development. It was the product of months long secret consultations among various forces, with the Indian spy agency RAWplaying a leading role. The pay off is already seen in the statements made by the new Sri Lankan rulers on 'correcting the imbalance' in foreign relations and the express visit made to Delhi by their new foreign minister. But Sri Lanka’s growing relations with China, even at the expense India, was not just some purely Rajapaksa affair. It is rootedt in the interests of the Sri Lankan ruling classes. Despite the change of regime they will continue to try to benefit by manoeuvring between Indian and Chinese expansionism. At the most there may be some move away by the Maithripala government from Rajapaksa’s overt tilt to China in order to manoeuvre all the better. China has invested nearly Rs 30,000 crore in that country since 2009 compared to India's Rs 180 crores.

Meanwhile, Pakistan has strengthened ties with Russia which delivered advanced weapons to it disregarding the objections of the Indian ruling classes. The recent summit meeting between Putin and Modi has repeated the usual verbiage on the ‘strategic partnership’ between Russia and India. After the usual condemnations of 'terrorism' their joint statement goes on to state, “The leaders expressed hope that all safe havens and sanctuaries for terrorists will be wiped out without delay and terrorism would be completely eradicated from the common region within a decade.”What stands out here is the change in wording compared to last year's statement. There the targeting of Pakistan was rather obvious –– “… terrorist acts … may have international linkages extending across and beyond the borders. States that provide aid, abetment and shelter for such terrorist activities are themselves as guilty as the actual perpetrators of terrorism.” Though India still remains a major market for Russian weaponry and both are members of the BRICS, Moscow is evidently readjusting its relations in South Asia in view of the growing dependence of the Indian rulers onWashington. In the short term there won’t be a total reframing –– India has its geopolitical value for Russian imperialism, not the least as a foil to China. But

Pakistan’s immediate gain, and the consequent weakening of Indian expansionism’s clout, is obvious

For all the aggressive hard sell of going from ‘Look East’ to ‘Act East’ in its pursuit of Indian expansionist interests the Modi regime still remains more or less where the UPA left off. Modi’s foreign policy is characterised by some (and criticised by others like the CPMCPI revisionists) as a total break from the one followed till now. Deepening ties with Zionist Israel, practically abandoning the Indian state’s long standing support to the Palestinian cause, is an often cited example. Its silence during last year’s genocide in Gaza surely gave ample evidence. But a meaningful look at India’s foreign policy, including its present specificities and nuances, demands a wide angled take. The striking shift in stance on Palestine is not a purely Modi or BJP impulse. Diplomatic ties with Israel were inaugurated in the early 1990s by the Congress led by Narasimha Rao. They were maintained and nurtured over subsequent decades by Central governments formed or supported by parties from the whole spectrum of parliamentary forces, all the way from the rightist BJP to the socalled leftist CPM. The continuity in the orientation of India’s foreign policy, no matter who rules, is striking. It emerges from the expansionist ambitions of what is essentially a comprador state. Significant shifts in its foreign policy orientation, seen over the six and odd decades of its existence, are well contained within this continuity

Two periods can be distinguished. The first was that of socalled nonalignment inaugurated by Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister.

Apparently indicating an independent bearing in foreign affairs it was actually a euphemism for the manoeuvring of the Indian ruling classes in the world arena. Two factors made this possible. The more important of them was the replacement of overt colonialism with indirect rule and domination through neo-colonialism.

The other was the growing contention between the imperialist blocs led by the US and Russia, which emerged as a super power after the restoration of capitalism in the 1950s. The first of these made nonalignment a possible option since the legitimacy of neocolonialism depended on allowing room for some amount of independent posturing by oppressed countries. Neocolonialism after all was itself mainly an imperialist response to the tide of national liberation struggles. It was meant to diffuse them by seeming to accede independence. The second factor, imperialist contention, created space for manoeuvring.

But possibility and space didn’t automatically translate into ‘nonalignment’ It was born from the need of the new rulers of the excolonies to actualise and utilise the space of formal independence granted by their neocolonial existence. Because, even after transferring power to their trusted agents, the colonial powers tried their best to retain as much direct control as possible in the erstwhile colonies. The US was championing ‘decolonisation’with the intent of coopting nationalist sentiments in the colonies to serve its aim of edging back the traditional powers and gaining a dominant position. But it too favoured tight control.

Military groupings like the CENTO and SEATO were formed for this. Though the containment of the socialist camp and communist movements in oppressed countries were made out to be the reason, the real aim was to lockin countries that had now gained formal political independence.

The ‘nonalignment movement’ (NAM) could emerge only by resisting this.

In the turbulent post2nd world war period, any opposition to the erstwhile colonial powers and the US quickly acquired a nationalist, progressive political hue. The world situation marked by a rising tide of national liberation struggles aided this. The NAM came to be regarded as the champion of national independence opposed toWestern imperialism. But a closer look would show that this was hardly the case. The NAM was not really driven by antiimperialism.

It was a continuation of the anticolonialism of compradors, already seen in political movements led by them in the colonial period; for example, the one led by the Indian National Congress. In the long run, NAMstyle opposition aided imperialist powers since the definition of imperialism was being restricted to colonialism at a time when neocolonialism was already replacing it in the real world. Thus, even while there were occasions of sharp contradiction and even conflict (the Goan war) with specific imperialist powers, ties of dependence toWestern imperialism and service to it could be well contained in the nonaligned stance of the Indian state.

India, Egypt and Yugoslavia were prominent initiators of the NAM. Among them, India had ties with multipleWestern imperialist powers and a fairly sizeable economy they were keen on exploiting. Egypt enjoyed strategic geopolitical importance. Yugoslavia had political value in the contention with the socialist camp. The US backed Yugoslavia against the socialist Soviet Union. In Egypt it stepped in against British and French imperialist aggression when Nasser, the then president of that country, nationalised the Suez Canal. India, under Nehru, allowed it to stage spying sorties over China.Within theWestern imperialist camp the NAM thus gave rise to opposing responses. Most saw it as a tool of the socialist camp. Yet there were others too who perceived in it a useful countervail against developments in the AfroAsian Bandung conference of 1955 where neocolonial countries joined up with socialist countries and revolutionary China gained prominence. This dimension of the NAM was gradually unravelled with the emergence of a new imperialist bloc, through the rise of Soviet social imperialism.When the relation between the two blocs went from collusion to contention in the early 1970s, the NAM bloomed as an institutional framework eminently suited to neocolonialism.

Growing contention between the  two blocs, led by the US and the Soviet Union, posed the pressing need before the comprador states to ally with one or the other. They could do this and still retain some manoeuvrability by being part of the NAM. On their part, the super powers could utilise its venues through their proxies and employ the ‘independence’ rhetoric to accuse each other of domination while continuing to pursue their imperialist agendas and poach on the other’s camp.

The social imperialist bloc initially enjoyed a bit of an advantage since it was unencumbered by any colonial past. But increasing instances of its aggressive moves, such as the occupation of Afghanistan, soon whittled this down. By the end of the 1970s, military pacts like CENTO and SEATO with an explicit colonial pedigree were winded up while the NAM remained and grew. But now its conferences increasingly, and openly, became another venue of super power contention.

The uniquely neocolonial characteristic of the nonalignment policy was best demonstrated by Indian expansionism itself when it signed the Soviet social imperialist proposed Defence Treaty of 1972 even while it remained a staunch proponent of the NAM. Despite threats of the US, it could attack and dismember Pakistan by manoeuvring and utilising the national liberation cause of Bangladesh. It seized and forcibly incorporated Sikkim. It gained nuclear weapon capacity. All of these moves strengthened and consolidated Indian expansionism’s domination in South Asia. But none of this was given by its strength as an independent power. They became possible within the larger framework of super power contention, under social imperialist protection guaranteed by the Treaty of 1972.

Once nonalignment is located within the broader international frame of imperialist relations, the logic of the shift in foreign policy initiated by the Indian National Congress’s Narasimha Rao government in the early 1990s becomes apparent.

This was necessitated by the new international situation. The collapse of social imperialism in the early 1990s and the recasting of neocolonial legitimacy under the aggressive push of globalisation had made nonalignment redundant.

Indian expansionist interests could no longer rely on social imperialism. It needed to toady to US imperialism. In hindsight, the grounds for this had already been laid down by Indira Gandhi in the beginning of the 1980s. Growing political and economic problems weakening Soviet social imperialism had begun to limit its capacity. The Indian ruling classes had to turn to the IMF. Since then, dependence on the US bloc kept on deepening. Though all the appropriate nonaligned gestures and rituals were followed, the tilt to the US in international relations became more and more explicit. Under Rajiv Gandhi, Indian military facilities were offered to refuel US war planes bombing Iraq. It fell to Narasimha Rao to give the crucial push. Quite significantly, this was accompanied by the turn to globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation, abandoning earlier economic policies that gave preference to the public sector and a greater role for the government.

To secure their comprador and expansionist interests the Indian ruling classes had to abandon the policies and structures built up under Nehru, both in the domestic and international realms. Such recasting however posed the threat of tearing off their guise of independence. This was further amplified by the turn in political discourse brought about by imperialist globalisation. For the several decades following the transfer of power in 1947, exposure of imperialism and its control, the role of the IMF andWorld Bank as neocolonial institutions and similar issues had been restricted to Maoist forces. It had almost disappeared even from the propaganda of the parliamentary left like the CPM and CPI. This would change with the global shift to globalisation and the fall of the social imperialist bloc leading to the near total domination of the US. Imperialist dependence and its institutional control became live topics even in parliamentary discourse, with ramifications going well beyond it.

Being forced to increasingly expose their subservience to imperialism, each act of the ruling classes was simultaneously acknowledging the correctness of Maoist analysis on the sham nature of India's independence. The attempt to distract public opinion through an aggressive promotion of Brahmanic Hinduism and its chauvinism was useful to the extent of deepening communal polarisation.

But it too failed in the matter of salvaging the independence banners of the ruling classes. In fact, the opportunities obtained by the Sangh Parivar to rule, whether the 13 day spell in 1996 or the full term of the 2nd NDA government, only showed it up as even more subservient to US interests. Since all the parliamentary parties were either in Central or State governments, and all were pushing the imperialist agenda of globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation, none within the ruling class spectrum could step in as saviour.

Independence, selfreliance and the whole package of terminology earlier employed to cover up the reality of a semicolonial, semifeudal existence had to be redefined. The global recasting of neocolonial legitimacy came in handy.